Differentially Private Filtering by Ny, Jerome Le & Pappas, George J.
1Differentially Private Filtering
Jerome Le Ny, Member, IEEE, and George J. Pappas, Fellow, IEEE
Abstract
Emerging systems such as smart grids or intelligent transportation systems often require end-user
applications to continuously send information to external data aggregators performing monitoring or
control tasks. This can result in an undesirable loss of privacy for the users in exchange of the benefits
provided by the application. Motivated by this trend, this paper introduces privacy concerns in a system
theoretic context, and addresses the problem of releasing filtered signals that respect the privacy of the
user data streams. Our approach relies on a formal notion of privacy from the database literature, called
differential privacy, which provides strong privacy guarantees against adversaries with arbitrary side
information. Methods are developed to approximate a given filter by a differentially private version,
so that the distortion introduced by the privacy mechanism is minimized. Two specific scenarios are
considered. First, the notion of differential privacy is extended to dynamic systems with many participants
contributing independent input signals. Kalman filtering is also discussed in this context, when a released
output signal must preserve differential privacy for the measured signals or state trajectories of the
individual participants. Second, differentially private mechanisms are described to approximate stable
filters when participants contribute to a single event stream, extending previous work on differential
privacy under continual observation.
Index Terms
Privacy, Filtering, Kalman Filtering, Estimation
I. INTRODUCTION
A rapidly growing number of applications requires users to release private data streams to
third-party applications for signal processing and decision-making purposes. Examples include
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2smart grids, population health monitoring, online recommendation systems, traffic monitoring,
fuel consumption optimization, and cloud computing for industrial control systems. For privacy or
security reasons, the participants benefiting from the services provided by these systems generally
do not want to release more information than strictly necessary. In a smart grid for example, a
customer could receive better rates in exchange of continuously sending to the utility company her
instantaneous power consumption, thereby helping to improve the demand forecast mechanism.
In doing so however, she is also informing the utility or a potential eavesdropper about the type
of appliances she owns as well as her daily activities [1]. Similarly, individual private signals can
be recovered from published outputs aggregated from many users, and anonymizing a dataset
is not enough to guarantee privacy, due to the existence of public side information. This is
demonstrated in [2], [3] for example, where private ratings and transactions from individuals
on commercial websites are successfully inferred with the help of information from public
recommendation systems. Emerging traffic monitoring systems using position measurements
from smartphones [4] is another application area where individual position traces can be re-
identified by correlating them with public information such as a person’s location of residence or
work [4]. Hence the development of rigorous privacy preserving mechanisms is crucial to address
the justified concerns of potential users and thus encourage an increasing level of participation,
which can in turn greatly improve the efficiency of these large-scale systems.
Precisely defining what constitutes a breach of privacy is a delicate task. A particularly
successful recent definition of privacy used in the database literature is that of differential privacy
[5], which is motivated by the fact that any useful information provided by a dataset about a
group of people can compromise the privacy of specific individuals due to the existence of side
information. Differentially private mechanisms randomize their responses to dataset analysis
requests and guarantee that whether or not an individual chooses to contribute her data only
marginally changes the distribution over the published outputs. As a result, even an adversary
cross-correlating these outputs with other sources of information cannot infer much more about
specific individuals after publication than before [6].
Most work related to privacy is concerned with the analysis of static databases [5], [7]–
[9], whereas cyber-physical systems clearly emphasize the need for mechanisms working with
dynamic, time-varying data streams. Recently, the problem of releasing differentially private
statistics when the input data takes the form of a binary stream has been considered in [10]–
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3[12]. This work is discussed in more details in Section VI-B. A differentially private version of
the iterative averaging algorithm for consensus is considered in [13]. In this case, the input data to
protect consists of the initial values of the participants and is thus a single vector, but the update
mechanism subject to privacy attacks is dynamic. Information-theoretic approaches have also
been proposed to guarantee some level of privacy when releasing time series [14], [15]. However,
the resulting privacy guarantees only hold if the statistics of the participants’ data streams obey
the assumptions made (typically stationarity, dependence and distributional assumptions), and
require the explicit statistical modeling of all available side information. This task is very difficult
in general as new, as-yet-unknown side information can become available after releasing the
results. In contrast, differential privacy is a worst-case notion that holds independently of any
probabilistic assumption on the dataset, and controls the information leakage against adversaries
with arbitrary side information [6]. Once such a privacy guarantee is enforced, one can still
leverage potential additional statistical information about the dataset to improve the quality of
the outputs.
The main contribution of this paper is to introduce privacy concerns in the context of systems
theory. Section II provides some technical background on differential privacy. We then formulate
in Section III the problem of releasing the output of a dynamical system while preserving
differential privacy for the driving inputs, assumed to originate from different participants. It
is shown that accurate results can be published for systems with small incremental gains with
respect to the individual input channels. These results are extended in Section IV to the problem
of designing a differentially private Kalman filter, as an example of situation where additional
information about the process generating the individual signals can be leveraged to publish more
accurate results. Finally, Section VI is motivated by the recent work on “differential privacy under
continual observation” [10], [11], and considers systems processing a single integer-valued signal
describing the occurrence of events originating from many individual participants. Differentially
private approximations of the systems are proposed with the goal of minimizing the mean squared
error introduced by the privacy preserving mechanism. Some additional references to the related
literature are provided in Section VI-B.
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4II. DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY
In this section we review the notion of differential privacy [5] as well as some basic mecha-
nisms that can be used to achieve it when the released data belongs to a finite-dimensional vector
space. In the original papers on differential privacy [5], [7], [16], a sanitizing mechanism has
access to a database and provides noisy answers to queries submitted by data analysts wishing
to draw inference from the data. However, the notion of differential privacy can be defined for
fairly general types of datasets. Most of the results in this section are known, but in some cases
we provide more precise or slightly different versions of some statements made in previous
work. We refer the reader to the surveys by Dwork, e.g., [17], for additional background on
differential privacy.
A. Definition
Let us fix some probability space (Ω,F ,P). Let D be a space of datasets of interest (e.g.,
a space of data tables, or a signal space). A mechanism is just a map M : D × Ω → R, for
some measurable output space (R,M), whereM denotes a σ-algebra, such that for any element
d ∈ D, M(d, ·) is a random variable, typically written simply M(d). A mechanism can be viewed
as a probabilistic algorithm to answer a query q, which is a map q : D→ R. In some cases, we
index the mechanism by the query q of interest, writing Mq.
Example 1. Let D = Rn, with each real-valued entry of d ∈ D corresponding to some sensitive
information for an individual contributing her data, e.g., her salary. A data analyst would like
to know the average of the entries of d, i.e., the query is q : D → R with q(d) = 1
n
∑n
i=1 di.
As detailed in Section II-B, a typical mechanism Mq to answer this query in a differentially
private way computes q(d) and blurs the result by adding a random variable Y : Ω→ R, so that
Mq : D× Ω→ R with Mq(d) = 1n
∑n
i=1 di + Y . Note that in the absence of perturbation Y , an
adversary who knows n and all dj for j ≥ 2 can recover the remaining entry d1 exactly if he
learns q(d). This can deter people from contributing their data, even though broader participation
improves the accuracy of the analysis, which can provide useful knowledge to the population as
a whole.
Next, we introduce the definition of differential privacy [5], [7]. Intuitively, in the following
definition, D is a space of datasets of interest, and we have a symmetric binary relation Adj on
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5D, called adjacency, such that Adj(d, d′) if and only if d and d′ differ by the data of a single
participant.
Definition 1. Let D be a space equipped with a symmetric binary relation denoted Adj, and let
(R,M) be a measurable space. Let , δ ≥ 0. A mechanism M : D×Ω→ R is (, δ)-differentially
private if for all d, d′ ∈ D such that Adj(d, d′), we have
P(M(d) ∈ S) ≤ eP(M(d′) ∈ S) + δ, ∀S ∈M. (1)
If δ = 0, the mechanism is said to be -differentially private.
Intuitively, this definition says that for two adjacent datasets, the distributions over the outputs
of the mechanism should be close. The choice of the parameters , δ is set by the privacy policy.
Typically  is taken to be a small constant, e.g.,  ≈ 0.1 or perhaps even ln 2 or ln 3. The
parameter δ should be kept small as it controls the probability of certain significant losses of
privacy, e.g., when a zero probability event for input d′ becomes an event with positive probability
for input d in (1).
Remark 1. The definition of differential privacy depends on the choice of σ-algebra M in
Definition 1. When we need to state this σ-algebra explicitly, we write M : D× Ω → (R,M).
In particular, this σ-algebra should be sufficiently large, since (1) is trivially satisfied by any
mechanism if M = {∅,R}.
The next lemma provides alternative technical characterizations of differential privacy and
appears to be new. First, we introduce some notation. We call a signed measure ν on (R,M)
δ-bounded if it satisfies ν(S) ≤ δ for all S ∈ M [18, p.180]. A measure is sometimes called
positive measure for emphasis. For (R,M) a measurable space, we denote by Fb(R) the space
of bounded real-valued measurable functions on R and we define µg :=
∫
g dµ for g ∈ Fb(R)
and µ a positive measure on M.
Lemma 1. The following are equivalent:
(a) M is (, δ)-differentially private, satisfying (1).
(b) For all d, d′ ∈ D such that Adj(d, d′), there exists a δ-bounded positive measure µd,d′ on
(R,M) such that we have
P(M(d) ∈ S) ≤ eP(M(d′) ∈ S) + µd,d′(S), ∀S ∈M. (2)
September 12, 2012 DRAFT
6(c) For all d, d′ ∈ D such that Adj(d, d′), there exists a δ-bounded positive measure µd,d′ on
(R,M) such that for all g ∈ Fb(R), we have
E(g(M(d))) ≤ eE(g(M(d′))) + µd,d′g. (3)
Proof: (a) ⇒ (b). Suppose that M is (, δ)-differentially private. Define the signed measure
νd,d
′ by S 7→ νd,d′(S) := P(M(d) ∈ S)−eP(M(d′) ∈ S) [18, Section 5.6]. By the definition (1),
νd,d
′ is δ-bounded. Let µd,d′ be the positive variation of νd,d′ , i.e., µd,d′(S) = sup{ν(G) : G ⊂ S},
for all S ∈ M. Then µd,d′ is a positive measure [18, Section 5.6], is δ-bounded since νd,d′ is,
and since νd,d′(S) ≤ µd,d′(S) for all S ∈M, we have (2).
(b) ⇒ (c): Let B be a bound on g. For any k ≥ 1, we divide the interval [−B,B] in k
consecutive intervals Ii of length 2B/k, and we let Ai = g−1(Ii) and ci be the mid-point of the
interval Ii. Then (c) holds for the simple function
∑k
i=1 ci1Ai , and these functions approximate
g. We conclude using the dominated convergence theorem.
(c) ⇒ (a): Take g = 1S and use the fact that µd,d′ is δ-bounded.
A fundamental property of the notion of differential privacy is that no additional privacy
loss can occur by simply manipulating an output that is differentially private. This result is
similar in spirit to the data processing inequality from information theory [19]. To state it, recall
that a probability kernel between two measurable spaces (R1,M1) and (R2,M2) is a function
k : R1×M2 → [0, 1] such that k(·, S) is measurable for each S ∈M2 and k(r, ·) is a probability
measure for each r ∈ R1.
Theorem 1 (Resilience to post-processing). Let M1 : D×Ω→ (R1,M1) be an (, δ)-differentially
private mechanism. Let M2 : D× Ω → (R2,M2) be another mechanism, such that there exists
a probability kernel k : R1 ×M2 → [0, 1] verifying
P(M2(d) ∈ S|M1(d)) = k(M1(d), S), a.s.,∀S ∈M2, ∀d ∈ D. (4)
Then M2 is (, δ)-differentially private.
Note that in (4), the kernel k is not allowed to depend on the dataset d. In other words, this
condition says that once M1(d) is known, the distribution of M2(d) does not further depend
on d. The theorem shows that a mechanism M2 accessing a dataset only indirectly via the
output of a differentially private mechanism M1 cannot weaken the privacy guarantee. Hence
September 12, 2012 DRAFT
7post-processing can be used freely to improve the accuracy of an output, as in Section VI for
example, without worrying about a possible loss of privacy.
Proof: To the best of our knowledge, there is no previous proof of the resilience to post-
processing theorem available for the case of randomized post-processing and δ > 0. Let M1 be
(, δ)-differentially private. We have, for two adjacent elements d, d′ ∈ D and for any S ∈M2
P(M2(d) ∈ S) = E[P(M2 ∈ S|M1(d))] = E[k(M1(d), S)]
≤ eE[k(M1(d′), S)] +
∫
R1
k(m1, S) dµ
d,d′(m1)
= eP(M2(d′) ∈ S) + νd,d′(S).
The first equality is just the smoothing property of conditional expectations, and the inequal-
ity comes from (3) applied to the function k(·, S). Since k is a probability kernel, the inte-
gral on the second line defines a measure νd,d′ on R2, which is δ-bounded since νd,d
′
(R2) =∫
R1
k(m1,R2)dµ
d,d′(m1) =
∫
R1
1 dµd,d
′
(m1) = µ
d,d′(R1) ≤ δ.
B. Basic Differentially Private Mechanisms
A mechanism that throws away all the information in a dataset is obviously private, but not
useful, and in general one has to trade off privacy for utility when answering specific queries.
We recall below two basic mechanisms that can be used to answer queries in a differentially
private way. We are only concerned in this section with queries that return numerical answers,
i.e., here a query is a map q : D→ R, where the output space R equals Rk for some 1 ≤ k <∞,
is equipped with a norm denoted ‖ · ‖R, and the σ-algebra M on R is taken to be the standard
Borel σ-algebra, denoted Rk. The following quantity plays an important role in the design of
differentially private mechanisms [5].
Definition 2. Let D be a space equipped with an adjacency relation Adj. The sensitivity of a
query q : D→ R is defined as ∆Rq := maxd,d′:Adj(d,d′) ‖q(d)− q(d′)‖R. In particular, for R = Rk
equipped with the p-norm ‖x‖p =
(∑k
i=1 |xi|p
)1/p
for p ∈ [1,∞], we denote the `p sensitivity
by ∆pq.
1) The Laplace Mechanism: This mechanism, proposed in [5], modifies an answer to a
numerical query by adding i.i.d. zero-mean noise distributed according to a Laplace distribution.
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8Recall that the Laplace distribution with mean zero and scale parameter b, denoted Lap(b),
has density p(x; b) = 1
2b
exp
(
− |x|
b
)
and variance 2b2. Moreover, for w ∈ Rk with wi iid and
wi ∼ Lap(b), denoted w ∼ Lap(b)k, we have p(w; b) = ( 12b)k exp
(
−‖w‖1
b
)
, E[‖w‖1] = b, and
P(‖w‖1 ≥ tb) = e−t.
Theorem 2. Let q : D→ Rk be a query. Then the Laplace mechanism Mq : D×Ω→ Rk defined
by Mq(d) = q(d) + w, with w ∼ Lap (b)k and b ≥ ∆1q is -differentially private.
Note that the mechanism requires each coordinate of w to have standard deviation proportional
to ∆1q, as well as inversely proportional to the privacy parameter  (here δ = 0). For example,
if q simply consists of k repetitions of the same scalar query, then ∆1q increases linearly with
k, and the quadratically growing variance of the noise added to each coordinate prevents an
adversary from averaging out the noise.
Proof: We have, for S ⊂ Rk measurable and d, d′ two adjacent datasets in D,
P (Mq(d) ∈ S) =
(
1
2b
)k ∫
Rk
1S(q(d) + w)e
− ‖w‖1
b dw =
(
1
2b
)k ∫
Rk
1S(u)e
− ‖u−q(d)‖1
b dw
≤ e ‖q(d)−q(d
′)‖1
b
(
1
2b
)k ∫
Rk
1S(u)e
− ‖u−q(d′)‖1
b dw,
since −‖u−q(d)‖1 ≤ −‖u−q(d′)‖1 +‖q(d)−q(d′)‖1 by the triangle inequality. With the choice
of b = ∆1q/, we obtain the definition (1) of differential privacy (i.e., with δ = 0).
2) The Gaussian Mechanism: This mechanism, proposed in [7], is similar to the Laplace
mechanism but adds i.i.d. Gaussian noise to obtain (, δ)-differential privacy, with δ > 0 but
typically a smaller  for the same utility. Recall the definition of the Q-function
Q(x) := 1√
2pi
∫ ∞
x
e−
u2
2 du.
The following theorem tightens the analysis from [7].
Theorem 3. Let q : D → Rk be a query. Then the Gaussian mechanism Mq : D × Ω → Rk
defined by Mq(d) = q(d) + w, with w ∼ N (0, σ2Ik), where σ ≥ ∆2q2 (K +
√
K2 + 2) and
K = Q−1(δ), is (, δ)-differentially private.
Proof: Let d, d′ be two adjacent elements in D, and denote v := q(d) − q(d′). We use the
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9notation ‖ · ‖ for the 2-norm in this proof. For S ∈ Rk, we have
P(Mq(d) ∈ S) = 1
(2piσ2)k/2
∫
Rk
1S(q(d) + w)e
− ‖w‖2
2σ2 dw =
1
(2piσ2)k/2
∫
Rk
1S(u)e
− ‖u−q(d)‖2
2σ2 du
=
1
(2piσ2)k/2
∫
S
e−
‖u−q(d′)‖2
2σ2 e
2(u−q(d′))T v−‖v‖2
2σ2 du
≤ eP(Mq(d′) ∈ S) + 1
(2piσ2)k/2
∫
S
[
e−
‖u−q(d)‖2
2σ2 1
{
2(u− q(d′))Tv ≥ ‖v‖2 + 2σ2
}]
du.
The last integral term defines a measure S 7→ µd,d′(S) on Rk that we wish to bound by δ. With
the change of variables y = (u− q(d))/σ and the choice S = Rk in the integral, we can rewrite
it as P(Y Tv ≥ σ − ‖v‖2/2σ), with Y ∼ N (0, Ik). In particular, Y Tv ∼ N (0, ‖v‖2), hence is
equal to ‖v‖Z in distribution, with Z ∼ N (0, 1). We are then led to set σ sufficiently large so
that P(Z ≥ σ/‖v‖ − ‖v‖/2σ) ≤ δ, i.e., Q(σ/‖v‖ − ‖v‖/2σ) ≤ δ. The result then follows by
straightforward calculation.
As an illustration of the theorem, to guarantee (, δ)-differential privacy with  = ln 2 and
δ = 0.05, the standard deviation of the Gaussian noise should be about 2.65 times the `2
sensitivity of q. For the rest of the paper, we define κ(δ, ) = 1
2
(K +
√
K2 + 2), so that the
standard deviation σ in Theorem 3 can be written σ(δ, ) = κ(, δ)∆2q. It can be shown that
κ(δ, ) can be bounded by O(ln(1/δ))1/2/.
III. DIFFERENTIALLY PRIVATE DYNAMIC SYSTEMS
In this section we introduce the notion of differential privacy for dynamic systems. We start
with some notations and technical prerequisites. All signals are discrete-time signals, start at
time 0, and all systems are assumed to be causal. For each time T , let PT be the truncation
operator, so that for any signal x we have
(PTx)t =
xt, t ≤ T0, t > T.
Hence a deterministic system G is causal if and only if PTG = PTGPT . We denote by `mp,e
the space of sequences with values in Rm and such that x ∈ `mp,e if and only if PTx has finite
p-norm for all integers T . The H2 norm and H∞ norm of a stable transfer function G are defined
respectively as ‖G‖2 =
(
1
2pi
∫ pi
−pi Tr(G∗(eiω)G(eiω))dω
)1/2
, ‖G‖∞ = ess supω∈[−pi,pi) σmax(G(eiω)),
where σmax(A) denotes the maximum singular value of a matrix A.
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Fig. 1. Illustrative example of a system computing the sum of the moving averages (MA) of input signals contributed by n
individual participants. A differentially private version of this system, for the adjacency relation (5), will guarantee to user i that
the distribution of the output signal does not vary significantly when her input varies in ri-norm by at most bi. In particular,
the distribution of the output signal will not change significantly if user i’s input is zero (ui ≡ 0, e.g., because the user is not
present), or is not zero but satisfies ‖ui‖ri ≤ bi.
We consider situations in which private participants contribute input signals driving a dynamic
system and the queries consist of output signals of this system. First, in this section, we assume
that the input of a system consists of n signals, one for each participant. An input signal is
denoted u = (u1, . . . , un), with ui ∈ `miri,e for some mi ∈ N and ri ∈ [1,∞]. A simple example
is that of a dynamic system releasing at each period the average over the past l periods of the
sum of the input values of the participants, i.e., with output 1
l
∑t
k=t−l+1
∑n
i=1 ui,k at time t, see
Fig. 1. For r = (r1, . . . , rn) and m = (m1, . . . ,mn), an adjacency relation can be defined on
lmr,e = `
m1
r1,e
× . . .× `mnrn,e for example by Adj(u, u′) if and only if u and u′ differ by exactly one
component signal, and moreover this deviation is bounded. That is, let us fix a set of nonnegative
numbers b = (b1, . . . , bn), bi ≥ 0, and define
Adjb(u, u′) iff for some i, ‖ui − u′i‖ri ≤ bi, and uj = u′j for all j 6= i. (5)
A. Finite-Time Criterion for Differential Privacy
To approximate dynamic systems by versions respecting the differential privacy of the indi-
vidual participants, we consider mechanisms of the form M : `mr,e×Ω→ `m′s,e, i.e., producing for
any input signal u ∈ `mr,e a stochastic process Mu with sample paths in `m′s,e. As in the previous
section, this requires that we first specify the measurable sets of `m′s,e. We start by defining in a
standard way the measurable sets of (Rm′)N, the space of sequences with values in Rm′ , to be
the σ-algebra denoted Mm′ generated by the so-called finite-dimensional cylinder sets of the
form {y ∈ (Rm′)N : y0:T ∈ HT}, for T ≥ 0 and HT ∈ R(T+1)m′ , where y0:T denotes the vector
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[yT0 , . . . , y
T
T ]
T (see, e.g., [20, chapter 2]). The measurable sets considered for the output of M are
then obtained by intersection of `m′s,e with the sets of Mm′ . The resulting σ-algebra is denoted
Mm′s,e and is generated by the sets of the form
H˜T = {y ∈ `m′s,e : y0:T ∈ HT}, for T ≥ 0, HT ∈ R(T+1)m
′
. (6)
As for the dynamic systems of interest, we constrain in this paper the mechanisms to be causal,
i.e., the distribution of PTMu should be the same as that of PTMPTu for any u ∈ `mr,e and any
time T . In other words, the values ut for t > T do not influence the values of the mechanism
output up to time T . The following technical lemma is useful to show that a mechanism on
signal spaces is (, δ)-differentially private by considering only finite dimensional problems.
Lemma 2. Consider an adjacency relation Adj on `mr,e. For a mechanism M : `mr,e × Ω → `m′s,e,
the following are equivalent
(a) M is (, δ)-differentially private.
(b) For all u, u′ in `mr,e such that Adj(u, u
′), we have
P((Mu)0:T ∈ A) ≤ e P((Mu′)0:T ∈ A) + δ, ∀T ≥ 0,∀A ∈ R(T+1)m′ . (7)
Proof: a) ⇒ b) If M is (, δ)-differentially private, then for u, u′ adjacent, and for all
H ∈Mm′s,e, we have P(Mu ∈ H) ≤ e P(Mu′ ∈ H)+δ. In particular, for a given integer T ≥ 0,
we can restrict our attention to the sets H˜T of the form (6). In this case, we have immediately
P(Mu ∈ H˜T ) = P((Mu)0:T ∈ HT ) since the events are the same.
b) ⇒ a) Conversely, consider two adjacent signal u, u′ ∈ `mr,e, and let S ∈ Mm′s,e, for which
we want to show (1). Fix η > 0. There exists T ≥ 0 and HT ∈ R(T+1)m′ such that P(Mu ∈
S∆H˜T ) ≤ η and P(Mu′ ∈ S∆H˜T ) ≤ η, where A∆B := (A\B)∪(B\A) denotes the symmetric
difference. This is a consequence for example of the fact that the finite-dimensional cylinder
sets form an algebra and of the argument in the proof of [18, Theorem 3.1.10]. We then have
P(Mu ∈ S) ≤ P(Mu ∈ H˜T ) + η = P((Mu)0:T ∈ HT ) + η
≤ e P((Mu′)0:T ∈ HT ) + δ + η = e P(Mu′ ∈ H˜T ) + δ + η
≤ e P(Mu′ ∈ S) + δ + η(1 + e).
Since η can be taken arbitrarily small, the differential privacy definition (1) holds.
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B. Basic Dynamic Mechanisms
Recall (see, e.g., [21]) that for a system G with inputs in `mr,e and output in `m′s,e, its `r-to-`s
incremental gain γincr,s (G) is defined as the smallest number γ such that
‖PTGu− PTGu′‖s ≤ γ‖PTu− PTu′‖r, ∀u, u′ ∈ `mr,e, ∀T.
Now consider, for r = (r1, . . . , rn) and m = (m1, . . . ,mn), a system G : lmr,e → `m′s,e defined by
G(u1, . . . , un) =
n∑
i=1
Giui, (8)
where Gi : `miri,e → `m
′
s,e, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. The next theorem generalizes the Laplace and Gaussian
mechanisms of Theorems 2 and 3 to causal dynamic systems.
Theorem 4. Let G be defined as in (8) and consider the adjacency relation (5). Then the
mechanism Mu = Gu + w, where w is a white noise with wt ∼ Lap(B/)m′ and B ≥
max1≤i≤n{γincri,1(Gi) bi}, is -differentially private. The mechanism is (, δ)-differentially private
if wt ∼ N (0, σ2Im′), with σ ≥ κ(δ, ) max1≤i≤n{γincri,2(Gi) bi}.
Proof: Consider two adjacent signals u, u′, differing say in their ith component. Then, for
α ∈ {1, 2}, we have
‖PTGu− PTGu′‖α = ‖PTGiui − PTGiu′i‖α ≤ γri,α‖PTui − PTu′i‖ri
≤ γri,α‖ui − u′i‖ri ≤ γri,αbi.
This leads to a bound on the `1 and `2 sensitivity of PTG, valid for all T . The result is then an
application of Theorems 2 and 3 and Lemma 2, since (7) is satisfied for all T .
Corollary 1. Let G be defined as in (8) with each system Gi linear, and ri = 2 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Then the mechanism Mu = Gu+w, where w is a white Gaussian noise with wt ∼ N (0, σ2Im′)
and σ ≥ κ(δ, ) max1≤i≤n{‖Gi‖∞ bi}, is (, δ)-differentially private for (5).
C. Filter Approximation Set-ups for Differential Privacy
Let ri = 2 for all i and G be linear as in the Corollary 1, and assume for simplicity the
same bound b21 = . . . = b
2
n = B for the allowed variations in energy of each input signal. We
have then two simple mechanisms producing a differentially private version of G, depicted on
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Fig. 2. Two architectures for differential privacy. (a) Input perturbation. (b) Output perturbation.
Fig. 2. The first one directly perturbs each input signal ui by adding to it a white Gaussian noise
wi with wi,t ∼ N (0, σ2Imi) and σ2 = κ(δ, )2B. These perturbations on each input channel
are then passed through G, leading to a mean squared error (MSE) for the output equal to
κ(δ, )2B‖G‖22 = κ(δ, )2B
∑n
i=1 ‖Gi‖22. Alternatively, we can add a single source of noise at the
output of G according to Corollary 1, in which case the MSE is κ(δ, )2Bmax1≤i≤n{‖Gi‖2∞}.
Both of these schemes should be evaluated depending on the system G and the number n of
participants, as none of the error bound is better than the other in all circumstances. For example,
if n is small or if the bandwidths of the individual transfer functions Gi do not overlap, the error
bound for the input perturbation scheme can be smaller. Another advantage of this scheme is
that the users can release differentially private signals themselves without relying on a trusted
server. However, there are cryptographic means for achieving the output perturbation scheme
without centralized trusted server as well, see, e.g., [22].
Example 2. Consider again the problem of releasing the average over the past l periods of
the sum of the input signals, i.e., G = ∑ni=1 Gi with (Giui)t = 1l ∑tk=t−l+1 ui,k, for all i. Then
‖Gi‖22 = 1/l, whereas ‖Gi‖∞ = 1, for all i. The MSE for the scheme with the noise at the input
is then κ(δ, )2Bn/l. With the noise at the output, the MSE is κ(δ, )2B, which is better exactly
when n > l, i.e., the number of users is larger than the averaging window.
IV. DIFFERENTIALLY PRIVATE KALMAN FILTERING
We now discuss the Kalman filtering problem subject to a differential privacy constraint.
Compared to the previous section, for Kalman filtering it is assumed that more is publicly
known about the dynamics of the processes producing the individual signals. The goal here
is to guarantee differential privacy for the individual state trajectories. Section V describes an
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application of the privacy mechanisms presented here to a traffic monitoring problem.
A. A Differentially Private Kalman Filter
Consider a set of n linear systems, each with independent dynamics
xi,t+1 = Aixi,t +Biwi,t, t ≥ 0, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, (9)
where wi is a standard zero-mean Gaussian white noise process with covariance E[wi,twi,t′ ] =
δt−t′ , and the initial condition xi,0 is a Gaussian random variable with mean x¯i,0, independent
of the noise process wi. System i, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, sends measurements
yi,t = Cixi,t +Diwi,t (10)
to a data aggregator. We assume for simplicity that the matrices Di are full row rank. Figure 3
shows this initial set-up.
The data aggregator aims at releasing a signal that asymptotically minimizes the minimum
mean squared error with respect to a linear combination of the individual states. That is, the
quantity of interest to be estimated at each period is zt =
∑n
i=1 Lixi,t, where Li are given
matrices, and we are looking for a causal estimator zˆ constructed from the signals yi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
solution of
min
zˆ
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
E
[‖zt − zˆt‖22] .
The data x¯i,0, Ai, Bi, Ci, Di, Li, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, are assumed to be public information. For all 1 ≤
i ≤ n, we assume that the pairs (Ai, Ci) are detectable and the pairs (Ai, Bi) are stabilizable. In
the absence of privacy constraint, the optimal estimator is zˆt =
∑n
i=1 Lixˆi,t, with xˆi,t provided
by the steady-state Kalman filter estimating the state of system i from yi [23], and denoted Ki
in the following.
Suppose now that the publicly released estimate should guarantee the differential privacy of the
participants. This requires that we first specify an adjacency relation on the appropriate space of
datasets. Let x = [xT1 , . . . , x
T
n ]
T and y = [yT1 , . . . , y
T
n ]
T denote the global state and measurement
signals. Assume that the mechanism is required to guarantee differential privacy with respect to
a subset Si := {i1, . . . , ik} of the coordinates of the state trajectory xi. Let the selection matrix
Si be the diagonal matrix with [Si]jj = 1 if j ∈ Si, and [Si]jj = 0 otherwise. Hence Siv sets the
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Fig. 3. Kalman filtering set-up.
coordinates of a vector v which do not belong to the set Si to zero. Fix a vector ρ ∈ Rn+. The
adjacency relation considered here is
AdjρS(x, x
′) iff for some i, ‖Sixi − Six′i‖2 ≤ ρi, (I − Si)xi = (I − Si)x′i, (11)
and xj = x′j for all j 6= i.
In words, two adjacent global state trajectories differ by the values of a single participant, say i.
Moreover, for differential privacy guarantees we are constraining the range in energy variation
in the signal Sixi of participant i to be at most ρ2i . Hence, the distribution on the released results
should be essentially the same if a participant’s state signal value Sixi,t0 at some single specific
time t0 were replaced by Six′i,t0 with ‖Si(xi,t0 − x′i,t0)‖ ≤ ρi, but the privacy guarantee should
also hold for smaller instantaneous deviations on longer segments of trajectory. Other adjacency
relations could be considered, e.g., directly on the measured signals y or more generally on
linear combinations of the components of individual states.
Depending on which signals on Fig. 3 are actually published, and similarly to the discussion
of Section III-C, there are different points at which a privacy inducing noise can be introduced.
First, for the input noise injection mechanism, the noise can be added by each participant directly
to their transmitted measurement signal yi. Namely, since for two state trajectories xi, x′i adjacent
according to (11) we have xi − x′i = Si(xi − x′i), the variation for the corresponding measured
signals can be bounded as follows
‖yi − y′i‖2 = ‖CiSi(xi − x′i)‖2 = ‖CiSiSi(xi − x′i)‖2 ≤ σmax(CiSi)ρi.
Hence differential privacy can be guaranteed if participant i adds to yi a white Gaussian noise
with covariance matrix κ(δ, )2ρ2iσ
2
max(CiSi)Ipi , where pi is the dimension of yi,t. Note that in
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this sensitivity computation the measurement noise Diwi has the same realization independently
of the considered variation in xi. At the data aggregator, the privacy-preserving noise can be
taken into account in the design of the Kalman filter, since it can be viewed as an additional
measurement noise. Again, an advantage of this mechanism is its simplicity of implementation
when the participants do not trust the data aggregator, since the transmitted signals are already
differentially private.
Next, consider the output noise injection mechanism. Since we assume that x¯i0 is public
information, the initial condition xˆi,0 of each state estimator is fixed. Consider now two state
trajectories x, x′, adjacent according to (11), and let zˆ, zˆ′ be the corresponding estimates produced
by the Kalman filters. We have
zˆ − zˆ′ = LiKi(yi − y′i) = LiKiCiSi(xi − x′i),
where we recall that Ki is the ith Kalman filter. Hence ‖zˆ − zˆ′‖2 ≤ γiρi, where γi is the H∞
norm of the transfer function LiKiCiSi. We thus have the following theorem.
Theorem 5. A mechanism releasing (
∑n
i=1 LiKiyi) + γ κ(δ, ) ν, where ν is a standard white
Gaussian noise independent of {wi}1≤i≤n, {xi,0}1≤i≤n, and γ = max1≤i≤n{γiρi}, with γi the
H∞ norm of LiKiCiSi, is differentially private for the adjacency relation (11).
B. Filter Redesign for Stable Systems
In the case of the output perturbation mechanism, one can potentially improve the MSE
performance of the filter with respect to the Kalman filter used in the previous subsection.
Namely, consider the design of n filters of the form
xˆi,t+1 = Fixˆi,t +Giyi,t (12)
zˆi,t = Hixˆi,t +Kiyi,t, (13)
for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, where Fi, Gi, Hi, Ki are matrices to determine. The estimator considered is
zˆt =
∑n
i=1 zˆi,t, so that each filter output zˆi should minimize the steady-state MSE with zi = Lixi,
and the released signal should guarantee differential privacy with respect to (11). Assume first
in this section that the system matrices Ai are stable, in which case we also restrict the filter
matrices Fi to be stable. Moreover, we only consider the design of full order filters, i.e., the
dimensions of Fi are greater or equal to those of Ai, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
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Denote the overall state for each system and associated filter by x˜i = [xTi , xˆ
T
i ]
T . The combined
dynamics from wi to the estimation error ei := zi − zˆi can be written
x˜i,t+1 = A˜ix˜i,t + B˜iwi,t
ei,t = C˜ix˜i,t + D˜iwi,t,
where
A˜i =
 Ai 0
GiCi Fi
 , B˜i =
 Bi
GiDi
 , C˜i = [Li −KiCi −Hi] , D˜i = −KiDi.
The steady-state MSE for the ith estimator is then limt→∞ E[eTi,tei,t]. Moreover, we are interested
in designing filters with small H∞ norm, in order to minimize the amount of noise introduced by
the privacy-preserving mechanism, which ultimately also impacts the overall MSE. Considering
as in the previous subsection the sensitivity of filter i’s output to a change from a state trajectory
x to an adjacent one x′ according to (11), and letting δxi = xi − x′i = Si(xi − x′i) = Siδxi, we
see that the change in the output of filter i follows the dynamics
δxˆi,t+1 = Fiδxˆi,t +GiCiSiδxi
δzˆi = Hiδxˆi,t +KiCiSiδxi.
Hence the `2-sensitivity can be measured by the H∞ norm of the transfer function Fi GiCiSi
Hi KiCiSi
 . (14)
Simply replacing the Kalman filter in Theorem 5, the MSE for the output perturbation
mechanism guaranteeing (, δ)-privacy is then
n∑
i=1
‖C˜i(zI − A˜i)−1B˜i + D˜i‖22 + κ(δ, )2 max
1≤i≤n
{γ2i ρ2i },
with γi := ‖Hi(zI − Fi)−1GiCiSi +KiCiSi‖∞.
Hence minimizing this MSE leads us to the following optimization problem
min
µi,λ,Fi,Gi,Hi,Ki
n∑
i=1
µi + κ(δ, )
2λ (15)
s.t. ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ n, ‖C˜i(zI − A˜i)−1B˜i + D˜i‖22 ≤ µi, (16)
ρ2i ‖Hi(zI − Fi)−1GiCiSi +KiCiSi‖2∞ ≤ λ. (17)
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Assume without loss of generality that ρi > 0 for all i, since the privacy constraint for the signal
xi vanishes if ρi = 0. The following theorem gives a convex sufficient condition in the form
of Linear Matrix Inequalities (LMIs) guaranteeing that a choice of filter matrices Fi, Gi, Hi, Ki
satisfies the constraints (16)-(17).
Theorem 6. The constraints (16)-(17), for some 1 ≤ i ≤ n, are satisfied if there exists matrices
Wi, Yi, Zi, Fˆi, Gˆi, Hˆi, Kˆi such that Tr(Wi) < µi,
Wi (Li − KˆiCi − Hˆi) (Li − KˆiCi) −KˆiDi
∗ Zi Zi 0
∗ ∗ Yi 0
∗ ∗ ∗ I
  0,

Zi Zi ZiAi ZiAi ZiBi
∗ Yi (YiAi + GˆiCi + Fˆi) (YiAi + GˆiCi) (YiBi + GˆiDi)
∗ ∗ Zi Zi 0
∗ ∗ ∗ Yi 0
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ I

 0,
and

Zi Zi 0 0 0 0
∗ Yi 0 Fˆi 0 GˆiCiSi
∗ ∗ λ
ρ2i
I Hˆi 0 KˆiCiSi
∗ ∗ ∗ Zi Zi 0
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ Yi 0
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ I

 0.
If these conditions are satisfied, one can recover admissible filter matrices Fi, Gi, Hi, Ki by
setting
Fi = V
−1
i FˆiZˆ
−1
i U
−T
i , Gi = V
−1
i Gˆi, Hi = HˆiZ
−1
i U
−T
i , Ki = Kˆi (18)
where Ui, Vi are any two nonsingular matrices such that ViUTi = I − YiZ−1i .
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Proof: For simplicity of notation, let us remove the subscript i in the constraints (16)-(17),
since we are considering the design of the filters individually. Also, define λ¯ = λ/ρ2. The
condition (16) is satisfied if and only if there exist matrices W, P˜1 such that [24]
Tr(W ) < µ,

W C˜ D˜
∗ P˜1 0
∗ ∗ I
  0,

P˜1 P˜1A˜ P˜1B˜
∗ P˜1 0
∗ ∗ I
  0. (19)
For the constraint (17), first note that we have equality of the transfer functions F GCS
H KCS
 =

A1 0
0 F
0
GCS
0 H KCS

for any matrix A1, in particular for A1 the zero matrix of the same dimensions as A. With this
choice, denote
A¯ =
0 0
0 F
 , B¯ =
 0
GCS
 , C¯ = [0 H] , D¯ = KCS.
Then the constraint (17) can be rewritten ‖C¯(sI − A¯)−1B¯ + D¯‖∞ < λ¯, and is satisfied if and
only if there exists a matrix P˜2, of the same dimensions as P˜1, such that [24]
P˜2 0 P˜2A¯ P˜2B¯
∗ λ¯I C¯ D¯
∗ ∗ P˜2 0
∗ ∗ ∗ I
  0. (20)
The sufficient condition of the theorem is obtained by adding the constraint
P˜ := P˜1 = P˜2 (21)
and using the change of variable suggested in [25, p. 902]. Namely, assume that there are matrices
F,G,H,K, P˜ , and W satisfying (19), (20), (21). We partition the positive definite matrix P˜ and
its inverse as
P˜ =
 Y V
V T Yˆ
 , P˜−1 =
X U
UT Xˆ
 .
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Note that Y X + V UT = I . Define
J1 =
X I
UT 0
 , J2 =
I Y
0 V T
 . (22)
Then we have P˜ J1 = J2. Moreover
JT1 P˜ J1 =
X I
I Y
 , JT1 P˜ A˜J1 =
 AX A
Y AX + V GCX + V FUT Y A+ V GC
 ,
JT1 P˜ B˜ =
 B
Y B + V GD
 , C˜J1 = [(L−KC)X −HUT L−KC] .
Similarly,
JT1 P˜ A¯J1 =
 0 0
V FUT 0
 , JT1 P˜ B¯ =
 0
V GCS
 , C¯J1 = [HUT 0] .
Let Z = X−1. Consider first the congruence transformations
• of the first LMI in (19) by diag(I, J1, I) and then by diag(I, Z, I, I),
• of the second LMI in (19) by diag(J1, J1, I), and then by diag(Z, I, Z, I, I),
• and of the LMI (20) by diag(J1, I, J1, I), and then by diag(Z, I, I, Z, I, I).
Then, the transformation Fˆ = V FUTZ, Gˆ = V G, Hˆ = HUTZ, between the filter matrix
variables F,G,H and the new variables Fˆ , Gˆ, Hˆ leads to the LMIs of the theorem. Hence these
LMIs are necessarily satisfied if the constraints (19), (20) are satisfied together with (21).
Now suppose that the LMIs of the theorem are satisfied. Since Z  0, we can define X = Z−1.
Moreover, since
Z Z
Z Y
  0, we have Y  X−1 by taking the Schur complement, and so
I − XY is nonsingular. Hence we can find two n × n nonsingular matrices U, V such that
UV T = I − XY . Then define the nonsingular matrices J1, J2 as in (22), let P˜ = J2J−11 , and
define the matrices F,G,H,K as in (18). Since J1 is nonsingular, we can then reverse the
congruence transformations to recover (19), (20), which shows that the constraints (16), (17) are
satisfied.
Note that the problem (15) is also linear in µi, λ. These variables can then be minimized subject
to the LMI constraints of Theorem 6 in order to design a good filter trading off estimation error
and `2-sensitivity to minimize the overall MSE. However, including these variables directly in
the optimization problem can lead to ill-conditioning in the inversion of the matrices Ui, Vi in
(18), a phenomenon discussed together with a recommended fix in [25, p. 903].
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C. Unstable Systems
If the dynamics (9) are not stable, the linear filter design approach presented in the previous
paragraph is not valid. To handle this case, we can further restrict the class of filters. As before
we minimize the estimation error variance together with the sensitivity measured by the H∞
norm of the filter. Starting from the general linear filter dynamics (12), (13), we can consider
designs where xˆi is an estimate of xi, and set Hi = Li, Ki = 0, so that zˆi = Lixˆi is an estimate
of zi = Lixi. The error dynamics ei := xi − xˆi then satisfies
ei,t+1 = (Ai −GiCi)xi,t − Fixˆi,t + (Bi −GiDi)wi,t.
Setting Fi = (Ai −GiCi) gives an error dynamics independent of xi
ei,t+1 = (Ai −GiCi)ei,t + (Bi −GiDi)wi,t, (23)
and leaves the matrix Gi as the only remaining design variable. Note however that the resulting
class of filters contains the (one-step delayed) Kalman filter. To obtain a bounded error, there is
an implicit constraint on Gi that Ai −GiCi should be stable.
Now, following the discussion in the previous subsection, minimizing the MSE while enforcing
differential privacy leads to the following optimization problem
min
µi,λ,Gi
n∑
i=1
µi + κ(δ, )
2λ (24)
s.t. ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ n, ‖Li(zI − (Ai −GiCi))−1(Bi −GiDi)‖22 ≤ µi, (25)
ρ2i ‖Li(zI − (Ai −GiCi))−1GiCiSi‖2∞ ≤ λ. (26)
Again, one can efficiently check a sufficient condition, in the form of the LMIs of the following
theorem, guaranteeing that the constraints (25), (26) are satisfied. Optimizing over the variables
λi, µi, Gi can then be done using semidefinite programming.
Theorem 7. The constraints (25)-(26), for some 1 ≤ i ≤ n, are satisfied if there exists matrices
Yi, Xi, Gˆi such that
Tr(YiLTi Li) < µi,
Yi I
I Xi
  0,

Xi XiAi − GˆiCi XiBi − GˆiDi
∗ Xi 0
∗ ∗ I
  0, (27)
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and

Xi 0 XiAi − GˆiCi GˆiCiSi
∗ λ
ρ2i
I Li 0
∗ ∗ Xi 0
∗ ∗ ∗ I
  0. (28)
If these conditions are satisfied, one can recover an admissible filter matrix Gi by setting
Gi = X
−1
i Gˆi.
Proof: As in Theorem (6), we simplify the notation below by omitting the subscript i. First,
from the error dynamics (23), the constraint (25) is satisfied if and only if there exists a positive
definite matrix P such that [24]
Tr(PLTL) < µ, (Ai −GiCi)P (Ai −GiCi)T + (Bi −GiDi)(Bi −GiDi)T ≺ P.
Letting X = P−1, introducing the slack variable Y , the change of variable Gˆ = XG, and using
the Schur complement shows that these conditions are equivalent to the existence of two positive
definite matrices X, Y such that (27) is satisfied. The LMI (28) derived from (26) is standard
[24], see also (20). As in Theorem 6, we restrict the search in this LMI to the same matrix X
as in (27), which results in a convex problem but introduces some conservatism.
V. A TRAFFIC MONITORING EXAMPLE
Consider a simplified description of a traffic monitoring system, inspired by real-world im-
plementations and associated privacy concerns as discussed in [4], [26] for example. There are
n participating vehicles traveling on a straight road segment. Vehicle i, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, is
represented by its state xi,t = [ξi,t, ξ˙i,t]T , with ξi and ξ˙i its position and velocity respectively.
This state evolves as a second-order system with unknown random acceleration inputs
xi,t+1 =
1 Ts
0 1
xi,t + σi1
T 2s /2 0
Ts 0
wi,t,
where Ts is the sampling period, wi,t is a standard white Gaussian noise, and σi1 > 0. Assume for
simplicity that the noise signals wj for different vehicles are independent. The traffic monitoring
service collects GPS measurements from the vehicles [4], i.e., receives noisy readings of the
positions at the sampling times
yi,t =
[
1 0
]
xi,t + σi2
[
0 1
]
wi,t,
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with σi2 > 0.
The purpose of the traffic monitoring service is to continuously provide an estimate of the
traffic flow velocity on the road segment, which is approximated by releasing at each sampling
period an estimate of the average velocity of the participating vehicles, i.e., of the quantity
zt =
1
n
n∑
i=1
ξ˙i,t. (29)
With a larger number of participating vehicles, the sample average (29) represents the traffic flow
velocity more accurately. However, while individuals are generally interested in the aggregate
information provided by such a system, e.g., to estimate their commute time, they do not
wish their individual trajectories to be publicly revealed, since these might contain sensitive
information about their driving behavior, frequently visited locations, etc. Privacy-preserving
mechanisms for such location-based services are often based on ad-hoc temporal and spatial
cloaking of the measurements [4], [27]. However, in the absence of a quantitative definition of
privacy and a clear model of the adversary capabilities, it is common that proposed techniques are
later argued to be deficient [28], [29]. The temporal cloaking scheme proposed in [4] for example
aggregates the speed measurements of k users successively crossing a given line, but does not
necessarily protect individual trajectories against adversaries exploiting temporal relationships
between these aggregated measurements [28].
1) Numerical Example: We now discuss some differentially private estimators introduced in
Section IV, in the context of this example. All individual systems are identical, hence we drop
the subscript i in the notation. Assume that the selection matrix is S =
1 0
0 0
, that ρ = 100 m,
Ts = 1s, σi1 = σi2 = 1, and  = ln 3, δ = 0.05. A single Kalman filter denoted K is designed to
provide an estimate xˆi of each state vector xi, so that in absence of privacy constraint the final
estimate would be
zˆ =
[
0 1
n
] n∑
i=1
Kyi =
[
0 1
]
K
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
yi
)
.
Finally, assume that we have n = 200 participants, and that their mean initial velocity is 45
km/h.
In this case, the input noise injection scheme without modification of the Kalman filter is
essentially unusable since its steady-state Root-Mean-Square-Error (RMSE) is almost 26 km/h.
However, modifying the Kalman filter to take the privacy preserving noise into account as
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Fig. 4. Two differentially private average velocity estimates, with n = 200 users. The Kalman filters are initialized with the
same incorrect initial mean velocity (75 km/h), in order to illustrate their convergence time.
additional measurement noise leads to the best RMSE of all the schemes discussed here, of
about 0.31 km/h. Using the Kalman filter K with the output noise injection scheme leads to
an RMSE of 2.41 km/h. Moreover in this case ‖K‖∞ = 0.57 is quite small, and trying to
balance estimation with sensitivity using the LMI of Theorem 7 (by minimizing the MSE while
constraining the H∞ norm rather than using the objective function (24)) only allowed us to
reduce this RMSE to 2.31 km/h. However, an issue that is not captured in these steady-state
estimation error measures is that of convergence time of the filters. This is illustrated on Fig. 4,
which shows a trajectory of the average velocity of the participants, together with the estimates
produced by the input noise injection scheme with compensating Kalman filter and the output
noise injection scheme following K. Although the steady-state RMSE of the first scheme is
much better, its convergence time of more than 1 min, due to the large privacy-preserving noise,
is also much larger. This can make this scheme impractical, e.g., if the system is supposed to
respond quickly to an abrupt change in average velocity.
VI. FILTERING EVENT STREAMS
This section considers an application scenario motivated by the work of [10], [30]. Assume
now that an input signal is integer valued, i.e., ut ∈ Z for all t ≥ 0. Such a signal can record
the occurrences of events of interest over time, e.g., the number of transactions on a commercial
website, or the number of people newly infected with a virus. As in [10], [30], two signals u
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and u′ are adjacent if and only if they differ by one at a single time, or equivalently
Adj(u, u′) iff ‖u− u′‖1 = 1. (30)
The motivation for this adjacency relation is that a given individual contributes a single event
to the stream, and we want to preserve event-level privacy [10], that is, hide to some extent the
presence or absence of an event at a particular time. This could for example prevent the inference
of individual transactions from publicly available collaborative filtering outputs, as in [3]. Even
though individual events should be hidden, we are still interested in producing approximate
filtered versions of the original signal, e.g., a privacy-preserving moving average of the input
tracking the frequency of events. The papers [10], [30] consider specifically the design of a
private counter or accumulator, i.e., a system producing an output signal y with yt = yt−1 + ut,
where u is binary valued. Note that this system is unstable. A number of other filters with slowly
and monotonically decreasing impulse responses are considered in [12], using a technique similar
to [30] based on binary trees. Here we show certain approximations of a general linear stable
filter G that preserve event-level privacy. We first make the following remark.
Lemma 3. Let G be a single-input single-output linear system with impulse response g. Then for
the adjacency relation (30) on integer-valued input signals, the `p sensitivity of G is ∆pG = ‖g‖p.
In particular for p = 2, we have ∆2G = ‖G‖2, the H2 norm of G.
Proof: For two adjacent binary-valued signals u, u′, we have that u − u′ is a positive or
negative impulse signal δ, and hence
‖Gu− Gu′‖p = ‖G(u− u′)‖p = ‖Gδ‖p = ‖g ∗ δ‖p = ‖g‖p.
We measure the utility of specific schemes throughout this section by the MSE between
the published and desired outputs. Similarly to our discussion at the end of Section III, there
are two straightforward mechanisms that provide differential privacy. One can add white noise
w directly on the input signal, with wt ∼ Lap(1/) for the Laplace mechanism and wt ∼
N (0, κ(δ, )) for the Gaussian mechanism. Or one can add noise at the output of the filter
G, with wt ∼ Lap(‖g‖1/) for the Laplace mechanism and wt ∼ N (0, ‖g‖2κ(δ, )) for the
Gaussian mechanism. For the Gaussian mechanism, one obtains in both cases an MSE equal
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Fig. 5. Differentially private filter approximation set-up.
to ‖G‖22 κ(δ, )2. For the Laplace mechanism, it is always better to add the noise at the input.
Indeed, we obtain in this case an MSE of 2‖g‖22/2 instead of the greater 2‖g‖21/2 if the noise
is added at the output.
We now generalize these mechanisms to the approximation set-up shown on Fig. 5. The
previous mechanisms are recovered when G1 or G2 is the identity operator. To show that one can
improve the utility of the mechanism with this set-up, consider the following choice of filters G1
and G2. Let G1 be a stable, minimum phase filter (hence invertible). Let G2 = GG−11 . We call this
particular choice the zero forcing equalization (ZFE) mechanism. To guarantee (, δ)-differential
privacy, the noise w is chosen to be white Gaussian with σ = κ(δ, )‖G1‖2. The MSE for the
ZFE mechanism is
eZFEmse := lim
T→∞
1
T
∞∑
t=0
E[‖(Gu)t − (Gu+ GG−11 w)t‖22]
= lim
T→∞
1
T
∞∑
t=0
E[‖(GG−11 w)t‖22] = κ(, δ)2‖G1‖22‖GG−11 ‖22.
Hence we are lead to consider the following problem
min
G1
‖G1‖22‖GG−11 ‖22 = minG1
1
4pi2
∫ pi
−pi
|G1(ejω)|2dω
∫ pi
−pi
∣∣∣∣ G(ejω)G1(ejω)
∣∣∣∣2 dω,
where the minimization is over the stable, minimum phase transfer functions G1.
Theorem 8. We have, for any stable, minimum phase system G1,
eZFEmse ≥ κ(, δ)2
(
1
2pi
∫ pi
−pi
|G(ejω)|dω
)2
.
This lower bound on the mean-squared error of the ZFE mechanism is attained by letting
|G1(ejω)|2 = λ|G(ejω)| for all ω ∈ [−pi, pi), where λ is some arbitrary positive number. It can
be approached arbitrarily closely by stable, rational, minimum phase transfer functions G1.
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Proof: By the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, we have(∫ pi
−pi
|G(ejω)|dω
)2
=
(∫ pi
−pi
|G1(ejω)|
∣∣∣∣ G(ejω)G1(ejω)
∣∣∣∣ dω)2 ≤ ∫ pi−pi |G1(ejω)|2dω
∫ pi
−pi
∣∣∣∣ G(ejω)G1(ejω)
∣∣∣∣2 dω,
hence the bound. Moreover, equality is attained if and only if there exists λ ∈ R such that
|G1(ejω)| = λ
∣∣∣∣ G(ejω)G1(ejω)
∣∣∣∣ , i.e., |G1(ejω)|2 = λ|G(ejω)|, ∀ω ∈ R.
To see that the bound can be approached using finite-dimensional filters, by Weierstrass theorem
we can first approximate |G(ejω)| arbitrarily closely by a rational positive function Gˆ. We then
set G1 to be the minimum-phase spectral factor of Gˆ.
The MSE obtained for the best ZFE mechanism in Theorem 8 cannot be worse than the MSE
for the scheme adding noise at the input, and is generally strictly smaller, since by Jensen’s
inequality we have (∫ pi
−pi
|G(ejω)|dω
2pi
)2
≤
∫ pi
−pi
|G(ejω)|2dω
2pi
= ‖G‖22.
In addition, the MSE of the ZFE mechanism is independent of the input signal u. However,
a smaller error could be obtained with other schemes, in particular schemes that exploit some
knowledge about the input signal. Note that once G1 is chosen, designing G2 is a standard
equalization problem [31]. The name of the ZFE mechanism is motivated by the choice of trying
to cancel the effect of G1 by using its inverse (zero forcing equalizer). Nonlinear components
can be very useful as well. In particular if we add the hypothesis that the input signal is binary
valued, as in [10], [30], we can modify the simple scheme adding noise at the input by including
a detector H in front of the system G, namely, for uˆt = ut + wt,
H(uˆt) =
1, uˆt ≥ 1/2,0, uˆt < 1/2.
This exploits the knowledge that the input signal is binary valued, preserves differential privacy
by Theorem 1, and sometimes significantly improves the MSE, depending on other characteristics
of the signal.
A. Exploiting Additional Public Knowledge
To further illustrate the idea of exploiting potentially available additional knowledge about
the input signal, consider using a minimum mean squared error (MMSE) estimator for G2 rather
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than employing GG−11 , since the latter can significantly amplify the noise at frequencies where
G1 is small. Let us assume that G1 is already chosen, e.g., according to Theorem 8 (this choice
is not optimal any more if G2 is not GG−11 ). Moreover, assume that that it is publicly known that
u is wide-sense stationary with mean and autocorrelation denoted
E[ut] = µ, E[usut] =: Ru[s− t].
From this data, the second order statistics of y and z on Fig. 1 are also known, in particular
Rz = f ∗ f˜ ∗Ru + σ2δ, Ryz = g ∗ f˜ ∗Ru,
where σ2 = κ(δ, )2‖G1‖22, δ is the impulse signal, f is the impulse response of G1, and f˜t = f−t.
We then design G2 to minimize the MSE
E[|yt − yˆt|2].
For simplicity, consider the case where G2 is restricted to be a finite-impulse response filter, i.e.,
yˆt = (G2z)t =
N∑
k=0
hkzt−k,
where N is the order of the filter. The vector h = [h0, . . . , hN ]T is the solution of the Yule-Walker
equations [32] 
Rz[0] Rz[1] . . . Rz[N ]
Rz[1] Rz[0] . . . Rz[N − 1]
...
...
...
...
Rz[N ] . . . . . . Rz[0]
h =

Ryz[0]
...
Ryz[N ]

According to Theorem 1, differential privacy is preserved since the filter G2 only processes
the already differentially private signal z. Even if the statistical assumptions turn out not to be
satisfied by u, the privacy guarantee still holds and only performance is impacted.
Example 3. Fig. 6 illustrates the differentially private output obtained by the MMSE mechanism
approximating the filter G = 1/(s(z) + 0.05), with s(z) the bilinear transformation
s(z) = 2
1− z−1
1 + z−1
.
The input signal is binary valued and the privacy parameters are set to  = ln 3, δ = 0.05.
For this specific input, the empirical MSE of the ZFE is 5.8, compared to 4.6 for the MMSE
mechanism. The simpler scheme with noise added at the input is essentially unusable, since its
MSE is κ(δ, )2‖G‖22 ≈ 30.1. Adding a detector reduces this MSE to about 17.
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Fig. 6. Sample path for the MMSE mechanism.
B. Related Work
Some papers closely related to the event filtering problem considered in this section are [10]–
[12], [33]. As previously mentioned, [10], [33] consider an unstable filter, the accumulator. The
techniques employed there are quite different, relying essentially on binary trees to keep track of
intermediate calculations and reduce the amount of noise introduced by the privacy mechanism.
Bolot et al. [12] extend this technique to the differentially private approximation of certain filters
with monotonic, slowly decaying impulse response. In fact, this technique can be extended to
general linear systems by using a state-space realization and keeping track of the system state
at carefully chosen times in a binary tree. However, the usefulness of this approach seems to
be limited for most practical stable filters, the resulting MSE being typically too large and the
implementation of the scheme significantly more complex than for a simple recursive filter.
Finally, as with the MMSE estimation mechanism, one can try to use additional information
about the input signals to calibrate the amount of noise introduced by the privacy mechanism.
For example, if there exists a sparse representation of the signal in some basis (such as a Fourier
or a wavelet basis), then one can try to perturb the representation coefficients in this alternate
basis. For example, [33] perturbs the largest coefficients of the Discrete Fourier Transform of the
signal. A difficulty with such approaches is that they are typically not causal and not recursive,
requiring an amount of processing that increases with time.
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VII. CONCLUSION
We have discussed mechanisms for preserving the differential privacy of individual users
transmitting time-varying signals to a trusted central server releasing sanitized filtered outputs
based on these inputs. Decentralized versions of the mechanism of Section III can in fact
be implemented in the absence of trusted server by means of cryptographic techniques [33].
We believe that research on privacy issues is critical to encourage the development of future
cyber-physical systems, which typically rely on the users data to improve their efficiency.
Numerous directions of study are open for dynamical systems, including designing better filtering
mechanisms, and understanding design trade-offs between privacy or security and performance
in large-scale control systems.
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